MAGTF AIR ASSETS AND THE JFACC

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JFACC Elective Class

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In every American conflict since World War II, the U.S. Air Force has found itself at odds with the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps over the employment of aviation assets. During the 1980's this confrontation focused on joint doctrine that established a Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC). The JFACC has continued to be a source of friction and debate between the services.[1] Even though this is still true, I believe that the Marine Corps and Air Force are making progress in the joint environment even though there are fundamental differences that may always remain due to separate service doctrine, missions, and traditional philosophies and beliefs. The intent of this paper is to discuss these differences and progress and perhaps dispel some common myths.

Air power doctrine is very different between the services. These differences are rooted in the service's differing roles, missions, and histories. The individual services equip, train, and think about the application of air power in different ways. None of these ways is inherently superior or inferior, but the differences have caused difficulties in the past.[2] The Marine Corps is organized to fight as a combined arms task force whose air assets are integral to their operations. Marine air wings were created to support and defend Marine ground troops. In contrast, the U.S. Air Force views air operations as the centerpiece of a joint operation and believes that all air assets should be placed under a centralized control with a strategic focus.

The Air Force hasn't always had only the other services to battle over command and control of air assets. In North Africa during WWII their difficulties were grounded

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[1] LtCol Henry Joe Coble, "JFACC: What is the impact of the USAF Composite Wing?", Thesis, (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 1992), 1.
[2] LCdr David J. Morgan, "A Reexamination of the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) Concept for the 21st Century", Thesis, (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 1999), 6.

in the tactical employment doctrine of their own service. Heavy bombers were oriented independently. In Korea, SAC bombers were tasked by their own CINC. The independent Air Force in Vietnam experienced the same convoluted command structure. In each conflict, a concerted campaign was mounted to unify command under a single authority to facilitate a theater wide perspective.[3]

The Air Force incorporated its service vision into the JFACC doctrine. Thus the Air Force doctrine for centralized control of air power has dominated the focus of the JFACC structure and processes. As a result, some believe that the other services are forced to operate under a system that doesn't fully reflect or appreciate their differing views on air employment. For all its success, Operation Desert Storm highlighted the difficulties caused by the preeminence of U.S. Air Force doctrine in the JFACC construct.[4] The Gulf War was the first test of the new concept, and each service came with different expectations as to how it would work. For the Air Force, the system reflected its ethos: airpower would function as an independent combat arm that could be massed for attacks anywhere in the theater. Each service could "nominate" targets, but the JFACC, USAF Lt.Gen Charles Horner, and his staff would decide what, when, and how the targets would be hit.[5] Following the war, Marine and Navy critics argued that the JFACC system in the Gulf War was so thoroughly an Air Force operation that it did not deserve the "joint" designation.[6]

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[3] Coble, 22.
[4] Morgan, 6.
[5] Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, *The General's War* (Boston, Ma: Little, Brown and Company, 1995), 310.
[6] LtCol Leroy D. Stearns, *U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991 The 3D Marine Aircraft Wing in Desert Shield and Desert Storm* (Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1999), 45.

For the Marines, the JFACC system was first and foremost a drain on their resources. The Marines did not have heavy ground forces like the Army but made up for weaknesses in armor and artillery with their own air wing. Tactical aircraft were an integral part of Marine Corps combat power and another method of firepower. All the combined arms of the Corps were organized and trained to operate as parts of the whole. That made the Marines less dependent than the Army on Air Force support of the land offensive. Any task that diverted Marine Air from its battlefield mission was seen as a distraction from the main event.[7]

The commanding general of the Marine air wing in Desert Storm, LtGen Royal Moore, and USAF Brigadier General Buster Glosson (chosen by Horner to develop the air campaign) worked out a solution to the Air Force and Marine dichotomy. Under the understanding, the Marines would cede all their A-6E tactical bombers, EA-6B jamming planes, and 50 percent of their F/A-18 fighter/attack planes to Horner as he saw fit. But the Marines would retain control of the remaining F/A-18s and all their AV-8B Harriers—close-air-support (CAS) aircraft. In return, the Marines would be able to draw on the Air Force's assets, such as its B-52s and A-10s, to soften up the Iraqis for the eventual ground war.[8]

The Marines, however, were never comfortable with the arrangement. The Marines even put limits on their involvement in the Air Force-dominated campaign. After the air-war planners ordered a Marine strike on a Scud rocket motor plant near Baghdad, the first and only Marine air attack near the Iraqi capital, LtGen Walter Boomer, commanding general of the Marine forces (I MEF) in Desert Storm, informed

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[7] Gordon and Trainor, 311.
[8] Gordon and Trainor, 311.

the Air Force that Marine aircraft were no longer available for carrying out strikes in central Iraq. It was one of a series of restrictions that the Marines imposed on their participation in the Air Force-run campaign. Eventually, they would try to withdraw all their aircraft from the Air Force campaign and conduct their own air war over southern Kuwait.[9] But it wasn't until just before the ground war that the Marines actually made this fundamental shift in "restrictions" concerning use of Marine air. With the ground war eminent in mid-February, General Moore focused his fixed-wing assets on MEF targets and would later comment, "With General Schwartzkopf's acknowledgement, about 15 days prior to the ground campaign, we were into battlefield preparation. At that time if a target didn't do something for I MEF and battlefield preparation, we weren't going…we weaned ourselves out of any deep strike support". But there were trade-offs going back and forth between 3d Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW) and the JFACC even during this late battlefield preparation phase. General Moore and General Horner would trade USMC strike sorties for A-10s and F-16's, although this give and take allowed 3d MAW to engage far more I MEF targets and priorities.[10]

The Marine Corps had understandable concerns about losing control of fixed-wing tactical aviation based on historical precedence in previous conflicts. In the Korean War, once the 1st Marine Division was placed in the main Eighth Army line in 1951, the commander of the Far East Air Forces succeeded in splitting off the 1st Marine Wing from the division and using it in general support of the Eighth Army. The efficacy of the air-ground team was much less than the Marines knew was possible. Marine leaders after the war spent a great deal of time and effort thinking about ways to ensure the future

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[9] Gordon and Trainor, 321.
[10] Stearns, 148.

integrity of the Fleet Marine Force.[11] The Air Force, however, continued to view tactical aviation as being effectively employed only under the aegis of a theater air commander. In Vietnam, this view was aggressively pursued by the U.S. Seventh Air Force commander and the 1st MAW, after three years of relative independence, was forced during 1968 into an Air Force-dominated "single manager" system that featured a high degree of centralized control from Saigon. The Seventh Air Force presumed to know the relative importance of scheduled and on-call CAS sorties well enough to redirect them if it saw a need to do so. Marine aviation, which had been painstakingly defended before and re-authorized by the U.S. Congress in the years since the Korean War based upon the full understanding of its unique requirements and methods, was severely constrained under this system. Response times for CAS requests plummeted and even higher priority pre-planned sorties were diverted for other purposes. Marines of that era again vowed to fight future efforts to institute a "unified" air command system.[12]

The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 mandated joint warfare and the authority of the Joint Force Commander (JFC) to appoint a JFACC to ensure unity of effort in a theater-wide air campaign. Under what is termed the 1986 Omnibus Agreement, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) commander would retain operational control of his organic air assets, and would provide sorties in excess of the MAGTF direct support requirements to the JFC for tasking through the JFACC. However, the JFC could redirect efforts through reapportionment and reallocation of any MAGTF tactical air sorties when they are required for higher priority missions. This last caveat is what concerned the otherwise lightly fire-powered

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[11]Stearns, 46.
[12] Stearns, 46.

Marines.[13] They feared that the "joint strategic missions" would require so many assets that the optimum support of the specifically trained and equipped MAGTF team, and ultimately the Marine on the ground, would be compromised. So many senior Marine leaders, most of whom fought in Vietnam and carried with them the lessons of that war, were quite skeptical of the Air Force dominated JFACC system as Marines deployed to support Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

Fortunately for Marines, the USAF JFACC, General Horner, was at heart a practical man when it came to some of their concerns. General Horner made it clear to General Moore that he had no doctrinal axe to grind with Marine Aviation. The early apportionment agreement between Moore and Glosson gave the Marine Corps complete control over the majority of its close support assets. Horner knew that he had sufficient assets to accomplish all the required missions.

One army officer described apportionment as "bean counting at its finest" and contends that concerns about actual percentages of effort is meaningless. Commanders are concerned with mission accomplishment: specifically how long will it take and what it will cost. They are concerned with achieving effects. "If yours is the most important fight on the battlefield, the Air Force will be there."[14] General Horner once said that there are no Army targets, no Air Force targets, and no Marine targets, just Commander-in-chief targets.[15]

The 3d MAW was never convinced that the Air Force's strategic bombing would accomplish the theater goals of getting Iraq out of Kuwait. The Marines slowly flew more and more tactical sorties and focused on bombing targets in Kuwait. This does not

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[13] Stearns, 47.
[14] LtCol William G. Welch, USA, "We're Still Not Joint," *Proceedings*, February 1996, 60.

mean that the JFACC and the Air Tasking Order were not supported in the destruction of strategic or integrated air defense targets. It was, but all the while, the Marines husbanded some aviation assets and remained focused on what it was convinced it would take to get the MEF job done.[16] But after the early days of the strategic air campaign, the Army and Marine component commanders became concerned that the prospective battlefield in Kuwait and southern Iraq was not receiving the weight of effort they wanted. The allegation was along the lines that the Air Force was running its own autonomous show and not paying sufficient attention to the needs of other services.[17] Ground commanders, as a result, complained of insufficient air support in their sectors, and the Marines tended to withhold Marine aircraft from assignment to the master attack plan in order to accomplish missions that they deemed most important.[18]

During the ground war, most of the scheduled Marine fixed-wing CAS missions continued to be in the kill boxes beyond the fire support coordination lines and working with the F/A-18D Forward Air Controllers (FACs). Actual CAS missions supported by a ground forward air controller were rare in comparison to the number of total missions flown. As it turned out, relatively few close air support sorties were required because much of the enemy strength was neutralized before the start of the ground campaign. RAND calculated that slightly under 4,400 CAS sorties were flown during Desert Storm, out of 112,000.[19] The vast majority of these were flown during the ground war period of 23-27 February. The Air Force flew 1,461 CAS sorties—mostly in support of U.S. Army

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[15] Welch, 61.
[16] Sterns, 175.
[17] James A. Winnefeld, Preston Niblack, and Dana Johnson, *A League of Airmen: U.S. Air Power in the Gulf War* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1994), 81-82.
[18] Winnefeld, Niblack, and Johnson, 110.
[19] Winnefeld, Niblack, and Johnson, 113.

and Coalition forces and typically to accomplish an alternative interdiction mission while Marines provided almost all of their own close air support.[20]

USMC Brigadier General Granville Amos, the 3d MAW assistant wing commander in Desert Storm, had some prophetic words and an admonition for those historical writers who would inevitably follow this war:

> We are going to discuss it for years. Books are going to be written. The Marines…will self-flagellate and point fingers….But, I think that we've got to be careful of, as we are writing things down, that we don't lose sight of what our mission was and the fact that we did it….We had problems. We sat down at all levels and came up with solutions to the problems, not necessarily from the book…[21]

Whereas the F/A-18 was procured by the Marine Corps as a dual-role jet that is highly capable in both the air-to-air and air-to-ground arenas, the AV-8B was bought primarily as an air-to-ground platform with CAS as its primary mission. But in actual use, even the Harrier flew mostly air interdiction missions and relatively few actual CAS missions in Desert Storm. And since Desert Storm, Harriers have yet to fly a single actual CAS combat sortie. The only combat sorties flown by USMC Harriers since Desert Storm have been in support of JFACC missions in operations such as Allied Force or Southern Watch. The only time that USMC Harriers have actually dropped ordnance in combat since Desert Storm was in Allied Force. Even though Harriers have sailed with Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU) or Marine Amphibious Units (MAU) since 1974, the Harrier has yet to fire a single round or drop a single bomb in support of a MEU or MAU. Harriers from Marine Attack Squadron 331, flying off the *USS Nassau*, did conduct interdiction missions in support of the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade in

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[20] Winnefeld, Niblack, and Johnson, 174.
[21] BGen Granville R. Amos interview, 5 Mar 91, Stearns, page 175. Gen Amos was the 3d MAW Assistant Wing Commander under Gen Moore.

Desert Storm for a few days, but were subsequently placed on the CENTAF ATO to conduct missions as directed by I MEF. The point is that Marine CAS assets will rarely be called upon to conduct actual CAS missions and can be better utilized by the JFC or JFACC to support their mission objectives. Even if operating under the direct control of a MAGTF commander in a JFC controlled theater, Marine fixed wing assets will generally have no actual combat mission unless they are integrated into the joint concept of operations.

Marine Corps and U.S. Navy aviation are tactical air forces. They are designed, appropriated for, equipped, and trained to assist their service component commander in accomplishing his mission assigned by the theater commander. Their aviation field-of-view is not typically theater wide.[22] Their focus is sea control, air interdiction, and close air support. On the other hand, the USAF is first and foremost concerned with air superiority or supremacy which forces a theater wide perspective on them. Once having satisfied their primary mission, their viewpoint for exploitation is still theater wide and they are best described as an operational level air force.[23]

The Marine Corps will still seek to exploit its organic combined arms capabilities. While the Marine Corps is determined to maintain the integrity of the MAGTF and will always maintain its basic organizational design of a Command Element, a Ground Combat Element, an Aviation Combat Element (ACE), and a Combat Service Support element, this doesn't mean that the ACE, for example, will always have a full complement of both rotary-wing and fixed-wing aircraft. As each mission will be unique, MAGTFs will be tailored, combined arms teams appropriate to the mission.

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[22] Paul R. Hill, "Making Marine Air Work in Joint Operations", Unpublished paper, Marine Command and Staff College (Quantico, VA: 1991), cited as a footnote by Coble, 21.

Aviation is an integral part of the Marine Corps' combined arms approach to warfighting and provisions must be made for basing these assets where they can best function as part of the MAGTF combined arms team. The Marine Corps vision of the future is primarily one of sea-based air power although selected elements may operate ashore.[24]

Recent Marine Corps concept papers such as *The MAGTF in Sustained Operations Ashore* still expound on the inherent flexibility of the MAGTF as an operational maneuver element that will:

> normally be employed as an independent formation, relying on its organic capabilities and exploiting connectivity throughout the joint force to acquire and extend external support as required. As a self-contained, self-sustaining combined arms force with integrated air, ground, command and control…the MAGTF is ideally suited to function as an enabling force, decisive force, or exploitation force…[25]

While there may certainly be another Korea or Vietnam or Desert Storm, more recent military operations and the most likely future operations will be smaller, limited campaigns with generally limited objectives. The U.S. military may never be free again to wage unlimited, total war against another nation where strategic bombing, virtually free of political restraints, will be unleashed to focus on strategic targets designed to destroy the enemy's war-making ability and will. Most operations will focus on tactical bombing and targets. Even USAF strategic bombers such as the B-2, B-1, and B-52 may strike tactical targets to include direct support of ground troops. These more limited operations are more in line with how the Marine Corps is equipped and trained to fight. Control over Marine aviation assets will mostly be a moot point. The odds of Marine

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[23] Coble, 21.
[24] Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, *The MAGTF in Sustained Operations Ashore,* (Washington D.C.: Department of the Navy, October 1998),, A-7.
[25] *The MAGTF in Sustained Operations Ashore,* A-2-A-3.

ground combat forces being engaged in heavy ground combat operations against conventional forces are slim. Unless forced to react to an unexpected enemy offensive or perhaps thrown into a blocking type position to stop or delay an aggressor nation force, our Marines will rarely be placed into a position where CAS will be crucial to mission success. Our political and military leaders will be very reluctant to put Marines or soldiers into a position where they are engaged in direct close combat with a capable enemy due to concerns about excessive casualties. With this in mind, there won't be any requirement for the MAGTF commander to husband his fixed-wing aviation assets in the unlikely event that he needs CAS to protect ground forces or to win on the battlefield.

A common misperception held by the Air Force is that Marines believe that CAS is the sole reason for existence of Marine tactical aviation. That may have been true for decades and may even be held as a basic tenet by many Marines, especially those from the Vietnam era. But the truth is that Marines, as a whole, realize that the most important mission of tactical aviation is to gain and maintain air superiority or supremacy. No Marine infantryman wants enemy jets or helicopters attacking his position. CAS is not the only mission that Marine tactical aviation performs or focuses on. Marine aviation performs six doctrinal functions to include Antiair Warfare (air superiority), Offensive air support, Assault support (primarily helos), Air reconnaissance, Electronic warfare, and Command of aircraft and missiles. CAS is a mission sub-set under Offensive air support. CAS may be the least most important or unnecessary mission in the mind of a MAGTF commander based upon his mission, the threat, and the current tactical situation. Even Marine aviators who routinely train for CAS would much rather engage enemy targets as far from friendly forces as possible. It is much easier to coordinate and reduces or

eliminates the fear of fracticide. Marines train for CAS and believe in it as a basic requirement of tactical aviation in the event that the ground forces are placed in a position where they need CAS to survive and win on the battlefield. Sometimes CAS becomes a necessity and not something you do because your service has always held it to be a traditional mission.

On the other hand, a common misperception by Marines is that the Air Force ignores CAS or doesn't believe in doing it. Most Air Force pilots believe, as do most Marines, that it's more effective to use air power to kill the enemy before he gets close enough to engage friendly ground forces. However, Air Force doctrine clearly states that CAS will often be "the most critical" mission air assets will perform. General McPeak stressed the importance of CAS during a January 1992 speech when he stated that "Where American troops are engaged on the ground….supporting them…should be our [USAF] primary concern."[26]

For those who emphatically believe that CAS is the most ineffective use of fixed-wing tactical aviation, they only need to remember the plight of the U.S. Eighth Army on the Pusan perimeter to realize that based upon the tactical situation at hand, CAS may very well be the most important mission at hand. Even the USAF commander in Korea was not going to let the North Koreans defeat the Eighth Army or push them into the sea while he focused on strategic targets further north. Our nation's center of gravity in future conflicts may continue to be public support and national will and this can be eroded very quickly if the bodies of soldiers and Marines are sent home in large numbers while the JFACC uses the majority of his tactical aviation assets to attack strategic targets.

But even as we saw in Desert Storm, the JFC or JFACC is not going let this happen. The Army and Marine Corps will get more than enough CAS sorties to support ground forces in the event of actual ground combat. No JFC or JFACC is going to want to answer to either the White House or the American public as to why soldiers or Marines were dying due to lack of proper air support if the assets were there.

Some of the more institutional concerns within the Marine Corps about the control of Marine air by an Air Force JFACC will disappear as younger Marine officers raised in a joint environment begin to assume senior leadership positions in the Corps. We are just now seeing Marine tactical aviators take command of Marine squadrons who didn't start to fly aircraft in support of the Fleet until after the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols act. These aviators have almost always operated in a joint environment and have been educated in joint military operations. Perhaps this generation of Marines, and those that will follow, will more easily accept the notion of a JFACC controlling Marine air in support of national or theater objectives.

Marine fixed-wing assets will most likely be used in future conflicts not as a part of an independent MAGTF operation autonomously, but as part of a Joint operation under the control of a JFACC. Marine Corps F/A-18s and EA-6Bs flew combat sorties over a period of several years in the 1990's against the Serbs under the direct control of a JFACC. The only MAGTF's involved in any of those operations such as Allied Force, Restore Hope, Deny Flight, and Deliberate Force, were MEU (SOC)s operating in the Mediterranean Sea. The Marine Corps is not going to sit around and wait for the next Desert Storm to get involved in actual combat operations. Both the Marine Corps as an institution and individual Marines have a warrior mentality and spirit and don't want to

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[26] Col Edward H. Houle, USAF, "JFACC—The Sequel", *Marine Corps Gazette*, May 1993, 84.

be "left out" of a fight. This may mean that only Marine fixed-wing tactical aviation is involved in many cases. But Marines will continue to serve our nation and CINCs in any capacity either as a complete MAGTF or as smaller entities based upon mission needs. Marine Colonel Andrew F. Mazzara said it very well when he wrote in 1994 that "The importance of maintaining the MAGTF intact cannot assume a preeminent position relative to the JTF commander's mission requirements."[27]

Just as Horner and Moore worked out agreements on the use of Marine aviation assets in Desert Storm, future MAGTF commanders and JFACCs may work out agreements as to the use of Marine air in support of the JFC mission. Sometimes decisions as to the use and apportionment of Marine aircraft are personality-driven. Service biases or prejudices coupled with ignorance of platform capabilities may allow for valuable and expensive national assets to be under-utilized or ignored. MAGTF commanders, when exercising the right of control under the Omnibus agreement, may elect to control all or the majority of fixed-wing MAGTF assets vice allowing the JFACC to use them as he sees fit to support theater objectives. This is especially true of the AV-8B, where in at least one actual case involving the author, a MAGTF commander agreed to give only a portion of his Harrier sorties to the theater JFACC in support of real-world combat operations so that the Marine ground combat element could continue to receive the majority of Harrier sorties to conduct CAS *training*.

Even today, most Marines still believe that the most important mission of Marine tactical aviation is to conduct CAS and that the sole purpose of jets such as the AV-8B is to do CAS. No Marine pilot would argue otherwise if Marines on the ground actually

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[27] Col Andrew F. Mazzara, USMC, "Integrating the MAGTF Into Joint Operations," *Marine Corps Gazette*, July 1994, 66.

needed CAS. In fact, in future operations, the MAGTF Air Combat Element (ACE) may be the primary maneuver element and the supported element. The Ground Combat Element (GCE) may support the ACE. It will all depend on the mission and the best means to successfully complete that mission with the least expenditure and risk of troops and equipment.

The Marine Corps will always cling tenaciously to its organic aviation assets. Success on the battlefield for the Marine Corps will continue to require a combined arms approach to warfighting. The strength of the Corps comes from all of its parts and its inherent esprit-de-corps. The Marine Corps cannot hope to survive without its organic aviation assets. Day in and day out the helicopter continues to be the most important aviation asset the Marine Corps has. There is hardly a single MAGTF mission that can be accomplished without helicopter support. Fortunately for the Corps, there are no arguments about the control of Marine helicopter assets. In addition to the firepower that Marine fixed-wing aircraft bring to the battle, one of the main emotional reasons that Marines will fight to retain their fixed-wing tactical aircraft is because it is the final piece that completes the MAGTF. Without the "A" for aviation, there is no MAGTF. And if the Corps only owned and operated helicopters, then it would be virtually no different in most respects as far as organic capability than U.S. Army light infantry. Some Marines fear that if the Corps ever loses complete control of its fixed-wing tactical jets, then the demise of the Marine Corps as an institution will not be far behind. Control of fixed wing air, therefore, becomes a very emotional issue.

Even though the MAGTF may stay intact for some missions, if the Marine Corps wants to include its most capable fixed-wing tactical asset, the F/A-18, in future

operations, it will have to depend on the USAF to help get the Hornet into the fight. A MEB-sized MAGTF may include only AV-8B's and helos that are sea-based on amphibious ships, and with the exception of four Marine Hornet squadrons that are assigned to Navy Carrier Air Wings, the Marine F/A-18s will need to be shore-based. Getting the Hornets, their support equipment, and troops from CONUS into the theatre of operations will most certainly require USAF support. And if Marine Hornets are being deployed in large numbers from CONUS for combat operations, you can bet that USAF, as well as Navy and possibly Army aviation assets, will be involved tactically as well. Which means a joint operation and a JFACC. Marines simply aren't going to fight alone on a large scale anywhere.

The Marines, Navy and Air Force pilots who together formed the Cactus Air Force defending Henderson Field on Guadalcanal in 1942 fought a common enemy for a single strategic end—survival. They set aside service rivalry, adapted their service doctrine, employed a single air component "commander", and overcame overwhelming odds to beat the Japanese.[28] But even with this "model" joint air campaign, the Marine mission priorities on Guadalcanal was air superiority, interdiction of Japanese ships, and finally CAS.[29] The future will most certainly be Joint and while the Omnibus Agreement was written to protect the integrity of the MAGTF, reality may still dictate that the MAGTF be divided as need be by the JFC to accomplish his mission. Depending on the mission, the intact MAGTF may be the best means of doing that. But the Marine Corps should not cling to tradition and written agreements at the expense of mission

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[28] Col Michael T. Probasco, USAF, "Joint Force Air Component Commander or Coordinator?" (Research paper, Air War College, 1994), 1.
[29] Stephan J. McNamara, "Airpower's Gordian Knot: Centralized Versus Organic Control," Thesis, (Maxwell AFB, AL: School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air University, May 1992), 73.

accomplishment. Regardless of tradition in Marine aviation command and control, Marines have and will always believe that the most important thing we do is mission accomplishment.

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